مقاله انگلیسی سواری مجانی صاحبان سرمایه

توضیحات

مقاله انگلیسی

سواری مجانی صاحبان سرمایه

Cost of Capital Free-Riders  سواری مجانی صاحبان سرمایه
Stephen P. Baginski
Lisa A. Hinson
The University of Georgia

THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW

American Accounting Association
Vol. 91, No. 5 DOI: 10.2308/accr-51379
September 2016
pp. 1291–۱۳۱

ABSTRACT:

We document the interrelationship of disclosure policy decisions among firms by providing evidence that the cessation of

quarterly management forecast guidance by 656 firms (‘‘stoppers’’) during 2004–۲۰۰۹ is associated with

a pursuant increase in quarterly forecasts by previously non-forecasting firms in the same industries (‘‘free-riders’’).

Increased forecasting by free-riders is positively associated with the information loss in the industry

(proxied by the number of stoppers in the industry,

the strength of previously existing information transfer relations between stoppers and free-riders,

and whether stoppers and free-riders are peer firms) and the importance of the information loss to the free-riders

(proxied by analyst following and the existence of new share issues).

Following the cessation event,

free-riders’ cost of capital decreases as a function of the extent to which free-riders immediately initiate quarterly forecasting.

Keywords:

management forecasts;

disclosure policy;

cost of capital;

information transfer

I. INTRODUCTION

asubstantial body of empirical research addresses the causes and consequences of voluntary management forecast disclosure.

۱ This research tends to focus on a firm’s management forecast disclosure choice in isolation,

overlooking the potential for informational interdependencies and, thus, voluntary disclosure choice interdependencies, among firms.

Although prior research establishes that management earnings forecasts by one firm affect the share prices of other firms  (i.e., the information transfer relation documented in Baginski [1987]

and Han, Wild, and Ramesh [1989]),

very little work considers whether the management forecast disclosure choices of one firm affect the management

forecast disclosure choices of other firms and the consequences of those reactive choices .